DNSSEC

• DNSSEC = standardized DNS security extensions currently being deployed
• Aims to ensure **integrity** of the DNS lookup results (to ensure correctness of returned IP addresses for a domain name)

Q: what attack is it trying to prevent?
A: attacker changes DNS record result with an incorrect IP address for a domain
Securing DNS Lookups

• How can we ensure that when clients look up names with DNS, they can trust the answers they receive?
• Idea #1: do DNS lookups over TLS (SSL)

• Background: TLS is a protocol for building an encrypted connection, using public-key exchange to exchange a session key, then using encryption and a message authentication code on all data sent over the connection
Host at \texttt{xyz.poly.edu} wants IP address for \texttt{www.mit.edu}

Idea: connections \{1,8\}, \{2,3\}, \{4,5\} and \{6,7\} all run over TLS
Securing DNS Lookups

• How can we ensure that when clients look up names with DNS, they can trust the answers they receive?

• Idea #1: do DNS lookups over TLS
  – Performance: DNS is very lightweight. TLS is not.
  – Caching: crucial for DNS scaling. But then how do we keep authentication assurances?
  – Security: must trust the resolver.
    **Object security vs. Channel security**
    How do we know which name servers to trust?

• Idea #2: make DNS results like **certs**
  – I.e., a **verifiable signature** that guarantees who generated a piece of data; signing happens **off-line**
what is IP addr of mail.google.com?

Q: How can we ensure returned result is correct?
A: Have google.com NS sign IP3
Q: What should the signature contain?
A: At least the domain name, IP address, cache time
Q: How do we know google.com’s PK?
A: The .com NS can give us a certificate on it
Q: How do we know .com’s PK?
A: Chain of certificates, like for the web, rooted in the PK of the root name server
Q: How do we know the PK of the root NS?
A: Hardcoded in the resolvers
Q: How does the resolver verify a chain of certificates?
**Scratchpad – let’s design it together**

**local DNS server (resolver)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NS of google.com:</th>
<th>IP1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>business.google.com</td>
<td>IP1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>finance.google.com</td>
<td>IP2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mail.google.com</td>
<td>IP3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Q:** How can we ensure returned result is correct?

**A:** Have google.com NS sign the “no record” response

sign(“dog.google.com” does not exist)

But it is expensive to sign online.

**Q:** What problem can this cause?

**A:** DoS due to an amplification of effort between query and response.
Q: How can we sign the no-record response offline?
A: We don’t know which are all the non-existent domains we might be asked for, but we can sign consecutive domains that do exist.

\[
\text{sign(["business.google.com", "finance.google.com"])}
\]

This indicates absence of a name in the middle and is cacheable.

Q: What problem can this cause?
A: Enumeration attack. An attacker can issue queries for things that do not exist and obtains intervals of all the things that exist until it mapped the whole space.
DNSSEC

Now let’s go through it slowly…
DNSSEC

• Key idea:
  – Sign all DNS records. Signatures let you verify answer to DNS query, without having to trust the network or resolvers involved.

• Remaining challenges:
  – DNS records change over time
  – Distributed database: No single central source of truth
Operation of DNSSEC

- As a resolver works its way from DNS root down to final name server for a name, at each level it gets a signed statement regarding the key(s) used by the next level
  - This builds up a chain of trusted keys
  - Resolver has root’s key wired into it
- The final answer that the resolver receives is signed by that level’s key
  - Resolver can trust it’s the right key because of chain of support from higher levels
- All keys as well as signed results are cacheable
Ordinary DNS:

www.google.com A?

Client’s Resolver

k.root-servers.net
Ordinary DNS:

We start off by sending the query to one of the root name servers. These range from a.root-servers.net through m.root-servers.net. Here we just picked one.
Ordinary DNS:

www.google.com A?

Client’s Resolver

com. **NS** a.gtld-servers.net
a.gtld-servers.net A 192.5.6.30
...

k.root-servers.net
Ordinary DNS:

www.google.com A?

Client’s Resolver

com. NS a.gtld-servers.net
a.gtld-servers.net A 192.5.6.30
...

k.root-servers.net

The reply didn’t include an answer for www.google.com. That means that k.root-servers.net is instead telling us where to ask next, namely one of the name servers for .com specified in an NS record.
Ordinary DNS:

www.google.com A?

com. NS a.gtld-servers.net
a.gtld-servers.net A 192.5.6.30 ...

This Resource Record (RR) tells us that one of the name servers for .com is the host a.gtld-servers.net. (GTLD = Global Top Level Domain.)
Ordinary DNS:

www.google.com A?

This RR tells us that an Internet address ("A" record) for a.gtld-servers.net is 192.5.6.30. That allows us to know where to send our next query.
Ordinary DNS:

Client's Resolver

www.google.com A?

com. **NS** a.gtld-servers.net
a.gtld-servers.net A 192.5.6.30
...

k.root-servers.net

The actual response includes a bunch of **NS** and **A** records for additional .com name servers, which we omit here for simplicity.
Ordinary DNS:

www.google.com A?

Client's Resolver

com. **NS** a.gtld-servers.net
a.gtld-servers.net A 192.5.6.30
...

k.root-servers.net

www.google.com A?

Client's Resolver

a.gtld-servers.net

We send the same query to one of the .com name servers we’ve been told about
Ordinary DNS:

```
www.google.com A?

Client's Resolver
com. **NS** a.gtld-servers.net
a.gtld-servers.net A 192.5.6.30
...

k.root-servers.net

Client's Resolver
www.google.com A?

google.com. **NS** ns1.google.com
ns1.google.com A 216.239.32.10
...

a.gtld-servers.net
```
Ordinary DNS:

Client's Resolver

www.google.com A?

com. **NS** a.gtld-servers.net
a.gtld-servers.net A 192.5.6.30 …

k.root-servers.net

That server again doesn’t have a direct answer for us, but tells us about a google.com name server we can try

Client's Resolver

www.google.com A?

google.com. **NS** ns1.google.com
ns1.google.com A 216.239.32.10 …

a.gtld-servers.net
Ordinary DNS:

Client's Resolver

www.google.com A?

com. NS a.gtld-servers.net
a.gtld-servers.net A 192.5.6.30
...

k.root-servers.net

Client's Resolver

www.google.com A?

google.com. NS ns1.google.com
ns1.google.com A 216.239.32.10
...

a.gtld-servers.net

Client's Resolver

www.google.com A?

...

ns1.google.com
Trying one of the google.com name servers then gets us an answer to our query, and we’re good-to-go … … though with no confidence that an attacker hasn’t led us astray with a bogus reply somewhere along the way :-(

www.google.com A?

Client's Resolver

com. NS a.gtld-servers.net
a.gtld-servers.net A 192.5.6.30

…

k.root-servers.net

Client's Resolver

www.google.com A?


…

ns1.google.com

Client's Resolver

www.google.com A?
DNSSEC (with simplifications):

www.google.com A?

Client’s Resolver

com. **NS** a.gtld-servers.net
a.gtld-servers.net. A 192.5.6.30...

com. **DS** com’s-public-key
com. **RRSIG** **DS** signature-of-that-
**DS**-record-using-root’s-key

k.root-servers.net
DNSSEC (with simplifications):

Client’s Resolver

www.google.com A?

com. NS a.gtld-servers.net
a.gtld-servers.net. A 192.5.6.30
...
com. DS com’s-public-key
com. RRSIG DS signature-of-that-
DS-record-using-root’s-key

Up through here is the same as before …
DNSSEC (with simplifications):

Client’s Resolver → www.google.com A?

com. NS a.gtld-servers.net
a.gtld-servers.net. A 192.5.6.30 ...

com. DS com’s-public-key
com. RRSIG DS signature-of-that-
DS-record-using-root’s-key

This new RR (“Delegation Signer”) lists .com’s public key

k.root-servers.net →
DNSSEC (with simplifications):

Client’s Resolver

www.google.com A?

com. NS a.gtld-servers.net
a.gtld-servers.net. A 192.5.6.30 ...
com. DS com’s-public-key
com. RRSIG DS signature-of-that-DS-record-using-root’s-key

This new RR specifies a signature (RRSIG) over another RR … in this case, the signature covers the above DS record, and is made using the root’s private key
DNSSEC (with simplifications):

The resolver has the root’s public key **hardwired** into it. The client only proceeds with DNSSEC if it can validate the signature.
DNSSEC (with simplifications):

The resolver again proceeds to trying one of the name servers it’s learned about.

Nothing guarantees this is a legitimate name server for the query!
DNSSEC (with simplifications):

```
google.com. NS ns1.google.com
ns1.google.com. A 216.239.32.10
...
google.com. DS google.com’s-public-key
```

Client’s Resolver → www.google.com A?

```
google.com. RRSIG DS signature-of-that-DS-record-using-com’s-key
```

a.gtld-servers.net →
DNSSEC (with simplifications):

Back comes similar information as before: google.com’s public key, signed by .com’s key (which the resolver trusts because the root signed information about it)
DNSSEC (with simplifications):

The resolver contacts one of the google.com name servers it’s learned about.

Again, nothing guarantees this is a legitimate name server for the query!
DNSSEC (with simplifications):

www.google.com A?

www.google.com. RRSIG A
signature-of-the-A-records-using-google.com’s-key

ns1.google.com

Client’s Resolver
DNSSEC (with simplifications):

Finally we’ve received the information we wanted (A records for `www.google.com`)! ... and we receive a signature over those records
DNSSEC (with simplifications):

Assuming the signature validates, then because we believe (due to the signature chain) it’s indeed from google.com’s key, we can trust that this is a correct set of A records … Regardless of what name server returned them to us!
DNSSEC – Mallory attacks!

Client’s Resolver

www.google.com A?

www.google.com. A 6.6.6.6

ns1.evil.com
DNSSEC – Mallory attacks!

Resolver observes that the reply didn’t include a signature, rejects it as insecure.
DNSSEC – Mallory attacks!

Client’s Resolver

www.google.com A?

www.google.com. A 6.6.6.6
www.google.com RRSIG A
signature-of-the-A-record-using-evil.com’s-key

ns1.evil.com
DNSSEC – Mallory attacks!

(1) If resolver didn’t receive a signature from .com for evil.com’s key, then it can’t validate this signature & ignores reply since it’s not properly signed …
DNSSEC – Mallory attacks!

(2) If resolver *did* receive a signature from .com for evil.com’s key, then it knows the key is for evil.com and not google.com ... and ignores it.
DNSSEC – Mallory attacks!

Client’s Resolver

www.google.com A?

www.google.com. A 6.6.6.6
www.google.com RRSIG A
signature-of-the-A-record-using-
google.com’s-key

ns1.evil.com
DNSSEC – Mallory attacks!

If signature **actually** comes from google.com’s key, resolver will believe it …

… but no such signature should exist unless either:
(1) google.com *intended* to sign the RR, or
(2) google.com’s private key was compromised
Issues With DNSSEC, cont.

• Issue #1: Partial deployment
  – Suppose `.com` not signing, though `google.com` is. Or, suppose `.com` and `google.com` are signing, but `cnn.com` isn’t. Major practical concern. What do we do?
  – What do you do with unsigned/unvalidated results?
  – If you trust them, weakens incentive to upgrade
    (man-in-the-middle attacker can defeat security even for google.com, by sending forged but unsigned response)
  – If you don’t trust them, a whole lot of things break
Issues With DNSSEC, cont.

• Issue #2: Negative results ("no such name")
  – What statement does the nameserver sign?
  – If "gabluph.google.com" doesn’t exist, then have to do dynamic key-signing (expensive) for any bogus request
  – Instead, sign (off-line) statements about order of names
    • E.g., sign "gabby.google.com is followed by gaelic.google.com"
    • Thus, can see that gadfly.google.com can’t exist
  – But: now attacker can enumerate all names that exist :-(


Issues with DNSSEC

• Issue #3: Replies are Big
  – E.g., “dig +dnssec berkeley.edu” can return 2100+ B
  – DoS amplification
  – Increased latency on low-capacity links
  – Headaches w/ older libraries that assume replies < 512B
Adoption of DNSSEC

• Adopted, but not nearly as much as TLS
• Difficulties with deploying DNSSEC:
  – The need to design a backward-compatible standard that can scale to the size of the Internet
  – Zone enumeration attack
  – Deployment of DNSSEC implementations across a wide variety of DNS servers and resolvers (clients)
  – Disagreement among implementers over who should own the top level domain keys
  – Overcoming the perceived complexity of DNSSEC and DNSSEC deployment
Summary of TLS & DNSSEC Technologies

• **TLS**: provides *channel security* (for communication over TCP)
  – Confidentiality, integrity, authentication
  – Client & server agree on crypto, session keys
  – Underlying security dependent on:
    • Trust in *Certificate Authorities* / decisions to sign keys
    • (as well as implementors)

• **DNSSEC**: provides *object security* (for DNS results)
  – Just integrity & authentication, not confidentiality
  – No client/server setup “dialog”
  – Tailored to be *caching-friendly*
  – Underlying security dependent on trust in Root Name Server’s key, and all other signing keys
Takeaways

• Channel security vs object security
• PKI organization should follow existing line of authority