Question 1  Clickjacking

In this question we’ll investigate some of the click-jacking methods that have been used to target smartphone users.

(a) In many smartphone browsers, the address bar containing the page’s URL can be hidden when the user scrolls. What types of problems can this cause?

**Solution:** If the real address bar is hidden, it’s much easier for an attacker to create and place their own on the website, fooling victims into thinking they’re browsing on sites they aren’t. JavaScript can scroll the page, hiding the address bar as soon as the page loads, allowing an attacker complete freedom to place a fake address bar.

For more info, check out [https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/upsec/tech/full_papers/niu/niu_html/niu_html.html](https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/upsec/tech/full_papers/niu/niu_html/niu_html.html) (section 4.2.2)

(b) Smartphone users are used to notifications popping up over their browsers as texts and calls arrive. How can attackers use this to their advantage?

**Solution:** By simulating an alert or popup on the website, an attacker can fool users into clicking malicious links. This can allow attackers to pose as phone applications such as texting apps or phone apps, which enables phishing.

(c) QR codes haven’t taken off and become ubiquitous like some thought they would. Can you think of any security reasons why this might be the case?

**Solution:** QR codes placed in public places are perfect targets for people with malicious websites. They can post their own, pretending to be links to useful websites, and instead linking to phishing sites. Or, they can modify and paste over existing codes, which only keen observers would notice.
Question 2  Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

In a CSRF attack, a malicious user is able to take action on behalf of the victim. Consider the following example. Mallory posts the following in a comment on a chat forum:

<img src="http://patsy-bank.com/transfer?amt=1000&to=mallory"/>

Of course, Patsy-Bank won’t let just anyone request a transaction on behalf of any given account name. Users first need to authenticate with a password. However, once a user has authenticated, Patsy-Bank associates their session ID with an authenticated session state.

(a) Explain what could happen when Alice visits the chat forum and views Mallory’s comment.

**Solution:** The img tag embedded in the form causes the browser to make a request to http://patsy-bank.com/transfer?amt=1000&to=mallory with Patsy-Bank’s cookie. If Alice was previously logged in (and didn’t log out), Patsy-Bank might assume Alice is authorizing a transfer of 1000 USD to Mallory.

(b) Patsy-Bank decides to check that the Referer header contains patsy-bank.com. Will the attack above work? Why or why not?

**Solution:** In most cases, it will solve the problem since the Referer header will contain the blog’s URL instead of patsy-bank.com.

However, not all browsers send the Referer header, and even when they do, not all requests include it.

(c) Describe one way Mallory can modify her attack to always get around this check.

**Solution:** She can have the link go to a URL under Mallory’s control which contains patsy-bank.com such as patsy-bank.com.attacker.com or attacker.com/attack?dummy=patsy-bank.com. Then this page can redirect to the original malicious link. Now the Referer header will pass the check.

Another solution, is if the Patsy-Bank has a so-called “open redirect” http://patsy-bank.com/redirect?to=... which the attacker can abuse this functionality by causing a victim’s browser to fetch a URL like http://patsy-bank.com/redirect?to=http://patsy-bank.com/transfer..., and from patsy-bank.com’s perspective, it will see a subsequent request for http://patsy-bank.com/transfer... that indeed has a Referer from patsy-bank.com.

(d) Recall that the Referer header provides the full URL. HTTP additionally offers an
**Origin** header which acts the same as the **Referer** but only includes the website domain, not the entire URL. Why might the **Origin** header be preferred?

**Solution:** Leaking the entire URL can be a violation of privacy against users. As an example, consider Alice transferred money by visiting `http://patsy-bank.com/transfer?amt=1000&to=bob` and subsequently went to a website under an attacker’s control - now the attacker has learned the exact amount of money Alice sent and to who. The **Origin** header would only leak that Alice was at the patsy-bank.com.

As a sidenote not directly related to the question, the **Origin** is a very useful way to solve the CSRF problem since it makes it much easier for multiple, trusted sites to make some action. For example, Patsy-Bank might trust `http://www.trustedcreditcardcompany.com` to directly transfer money from a user’s account. This is a use-case that the CSRF token-based solution doesn’t support cleanly.

(e) Almost all browsers support an additional cookie field **SameSite**. When **SameSite=strict**, the browser will only send the cookie if the requested domain and origin domain correspond to the cookie’s domain. Which CSRF attacks will this stop? Which ones won’t it stop? Give one big drawback of setting **SameSite=strict**.

**Solution:** It stops almost all CSRF attacks, except those involving open redirects from the website in question or if the website itself has an XSS vulnerability (discussed in the next problem).

However, setting **SameSite=strict** can greatly limit functionality since any external links that require a user to be logged in won’t work. For instance, consider a friend sends you a Facebook link via email, clicking on that link will require you to sign in again since your session cookie wasn’t sent with the request.
Question 3 \textit{CSRF++}

Patsy-Bank learned about the CSRF flaw on their site described above. They hired a security consultant who helped them fix it by adding a random CSRF token to the sensitive /transfer request. A valid request now looks like:

\[ \text{https://patsy-bank.com/transfer?to=bob&amount=10&token=<random>} \]

The CSRF token is chosen randomly, separately for each user.

Not one to give up easily, Mallory starts looking at the welcome page. She loads the following URL in her browser:

\[ \text{https://patsy-bank.com/welcome?name=<script>alert("Jackpot!");</script>} \]

When this page loaded, Mallory saw an alert pop up that says “Jackpot!” . She smiles, knowing she can now force other bank customers to send her money.

(a) What kind of attack is the welcome page vulnerable to? Provide the name of the category of attack.

\begin{quote} \textbf{Solution:} Reflected XSS \end{quote}

(b) Mallory plans to use this vulnerability to bypass the CSRF token defense. She’ll replace the \texttt{alert("Jackpot!");} with some carefully chosen JavaScript. What should her JavaScript do?

\begin{quote} \textbf{Solution:} Load a payment form, extract the CSRF token, and then submit a transfer request with that CSRF token. \\ Or: Load a payment form, extract the CSRF token, and send it to Mallory. \end{quote}

(c) \texttt{patsy-bank.com} sets \texttt{SameSite=strict} for all of its cookies. Does this stop the attack from part (b)? Assume the welcome page does not require a user to be logged in.

\begin{quote} \textbf{Solution:} Nope, because the malicious request will be sent from the welcome page of patsy-bank.com which is of the correct origin domain. \end{quote}

(d) Mallory wants to attack Bob, a customer of Patsy-Bank. Name one way that Mallory could try to get Bob to click on a link she constructed.

\begin{quote} \textbf{Solution:} Send him an email with this link (making it look like a link to somewhere interesting). Post the link on a forum he visits. Set up a website that Bob will visit, and have the website open that link in an iframe. Send Bob a text message or a message on Facebook with the link. \end{quote}
(There are many possible answers.)