XSS and CRSF

Question 1  Cross-site not scripting

Consider a simple web messaging service. You receive messages from other users. The page shows all messages sent to you. Its HTML looks like this:

Mallory: Do you have time for a conference call?
Steam: Your account verification code is 86423
Mallory: Where are you? This is <b>important!!!</b>
Steam: Thank you for your purchase
       <img src="https://store.steampowered.com/assets/thankyou.png">

The user is off buying video games from Steam, while Mallory is trying to get ahold of them.

Users can include arbitrary HTML code messages and it will be concatenated into the page, unsanitized. Sounds crazy, doesn’t it? However, they have a magical technique that prevents any JavaScript code from running. Period.

(a) Discuss what an attacker could do to snoop on another user’s messages. What specially crafted messages could Mallory have sent to steal this user’s account verification code?

Solution:
Steam: Your account verification code is 86423
Mallory: "> Enjoying your weekend?

This makes a request to attacker.com, sending the account verification code as part of the URL.

Take injection attacks seriously, even if modern defenses like Content Security Policy effectively prevent XSS.

(b) Keeping in mind the attack you constructed in the previous part, what is a defense that can prevent against it?

Solution: Content Security Policy; We can specify the sources/domains that are allowed to be used for the <img> tag or specify the sources to block. This will block <img> tags with invalid sources and will stop the image from loading.
Question 2  Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

In a CSRF attack, a malicious user is able to take action on behalf of the victim. Consider the following example. Mallory posts the following in a comment on a chat forum:

\[
\text{<img src="http://patsy-bank.com/transfer?amt=1000&to=mallory"/>}
\]

Of course, Patsy-Bank won’t let just anyone request a transaction on behalf of any given account name. Users first need to authenticate with a password. However, once a user has authenticated, Patsy-Bank associates their session ID with an authenticated session state.

(a) Explain what could happen when Alice visits the chat forum and views Mallory’s comment.

Solution: The \texttt{img} tag embedded in the form causes the browser to make a request to \texttt{http://patsy-bank.com/transfer?amt=1000&to=mallory} with Patsy-Bank’s cookie. If Alice was previously logged in (and didn’t log out), Patsy-Bank might assume Alice is authorizing a transfer of 1000 USD to Mallory.

(b) Patsy-Bank decides to check that the \texttt{Referer} header contains \texttt{patsy-bank.com}. Will the attack above work? Why or why not?

Solution: In most cases, it will solve the problem since the \texttt{Referer} header will contain the blog’s URL instead of \texttt{patsy-bank.com}.

However, not all browsers send the \texttt{Referer} header, and even when they do, not all requests include it.

(c) Describe one way Mallory can modify her attack to always get around this check.

Solution: She can have the link go to a URL under Mallory’s control which contains \texttt{patsy-bank.com} such as \texttt{patsy-bank.com.attacker.com} or \texttt{attacker.com/attack?dummy=patsy-bank.com}. Then this page can redirect to the original malicious link. Now the \texttt{Referer} header will pass the check.

Another solution, is if the Patsy-Bank has a so-called “open redirect” \texttt{http://patsy-bank.com/redirect?to=url}, the referrer for the redirected request will be \texttt{http://patsy-bank.com/redirect?to=...}. An attacker can abuse this functionality by causing a victim’s browser to fetch a URL like \texttt{http://patsy-bank.com/redirect?to=http://patsy-bank.com/transfer...}, and from patsy-bank.com’s perspective, it will see a subsequent request for \texttt{http://patsy-bank.com/transfer...} that indeed has a \texttt{Referer} from \texttt{patsy-bank.com}.

(d) Recall that the \texttt{Referer} header provides the full URL. HTTP additionally offers an \texttt{Origin} header which acts the same as the \texttt{Referer} but only includes the website...
domain, not the entire URL. Why might the Origin header be preferred?

**Solution:** Leaking the entire URL can be a violation of privacy against users. As an example, consider Alice transferred money by visiting http://patsy-bank.com/transfer?amt=1000&to=bob and subsequently went to a website under an attacker’s control - now the attacker has learned the exact amount of money Alice sent and to who. The Origin header would only leak that Alice was at the patsy-bank.com.

As a sidenote not directly related to the question, the Origin is a very useful way to solve the CSRF problem since it makes it much easier for multiple, trusted sites to make some action. For example, Patsy-Bank might trust http://www.trustedcreditcardcompany.com to directly transfer money from a user’s account. This is a use-case that the CSRF token-based solution doesn’t support cleanly.

(e) Almost all browsers support an additional cookie field SameSite. When SameSite=strict, the browser will only send the cookie if the requested domain and origin domain correspond to the cookie’s domain. Which CSRF attacks will this stop? Which ones won’t it stop? Give one big drawback of setting SameSite=strict.

**Solution:** It stops almost all CSRF attacks, except those involving open redirects from the website in question or if the website itself has an XSS vulnerability (discussed in the next problem).

However, setting SameSite=strict can greatly limit functionality since any external links that require a user to be logged in won’t work. For instance, consider a friend sends you a Facebook link via email, clicking on that link will require you to sign in again since your session cookie wasn’t sent with the request.
Question 3  CSRF++

Patsy-Bank learned about the CSRF flaw on their site described above. They hired a security consultant who helped them fix it by adding a random CSRF token to the sensitive /transfer request. A valid request now looks like:

https://patsy-bank.com/transfer?to=bob&amount=10&token=<random>

The CSRF token is chosen randomly, separately for each user.

Not one to give up easily, Mallory starts looking at the welcome page. She loads the following URL in her browser:

https://patsy-bank.com/welcome?name=<script>alert("Jackpot!");</script>

When this page loaded, Mallory saw an alert pop up that says “Jackpot!”. She smiles, knowing she can now force other bank customers to send her money.

(a) What kind of attack is the welcome page vulnerable to? Provide the name of the category of attack.

**Solution:** Reflected XSS

(b) Mallory plans to use this vulnerability to bypass the CSRF token defense. She’ll replace the `alert("Jackpot!");` with some carefully chosen JavaScript. What should her JavaScript do?

**Solution:** Load a payment form, extract the CSRF token, and then submit a transfer request with that CSRF token.

Or: Load a payment form, extract the CSRF token, and send it to Mallory.

(c) patsy-bank.com sets `SameSite=strict` for all of its cookies. Does this stop the attack from part (b)? Assume the welcome page does not require a user to be logged in.

**Solution:** Nope, because the malicious request will be sent from the welcome page of patsy-bank.com which is of the correct origin domain.

(d) Mallory wants to attack Bob, a customer of Patsy-Bank. Name one way that Mallory could try to get Bob to click on a link she constructed.

**Solution:** Send him an email with this link (making it look like a link to somewhere interesting). Post the link on a forum he visits. Set up a website that Bob will visit, and have the website open that link in an iframe. Send Bob a text message or a message on Facebook with the link.
(There are many possible answers.)
The following questions are optional

Question 4  Phishing

A phishing attacker tries to gain sensitive user information by tricking users into going to a fake version of a website they trust. The attacker might convince the user to go to what *appears* to be their bank and to enter their username and password.

i. What are some ways that attackers try to fool users about the site they are going to? How do they convince people to click on links to sites?

ii. What are some defenses you should employ against phishing?

Solution:

i. Attacks include:

   Sub domains that look like top level domains.

   Look alike UNICODE urls: bankofamerca.com, bankofthevvest.com

   Look alike unicode characters.

   Mentioning recent information. Compromising an email account and then sending emails to people that account has recently corresponded with.

ii. Defenses include:

   Use a browser-integrated password manager, it will automatically fail to fill in your password if the website is not legitimate.

   Do not click on unexpected links in emails.

   If your bank sends you an email about your account, go to your browser and separately type in the banks url, or call them. Do not click on links to sensitive sites that others provide you.

   Type sensitive domains directly into the address bar, or create a short cut that way and then use it.

   Some phishing emails or sites are not very well crafted. Subtle language or spelling errors, that should be out of place for the legitimate site, can be a warning sign that you should heed.
Question 5  \textit{Clickjacking}

In this question we’ll investigate some of the click-jacking methods that have been used to target smartphone users.

(a) In many smartphone browsers, the address bar containing the page’s URL can be hidden when the user scrolls. What types of problems can this cause?

\textbf{Solution:} If the real address bar is hidden, it’s much easier for an attacker to create and place their own on the website, fooling victims into thinking they’re browsing on sites they aren’t. JavaScript can scroll the page, hiding the address bar as soon as the page loads, allowing an attacker complete freedom to place a fake address bar.

For more info, check out https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/upsec/tech/full_papers/niu/niu_html/niu_html.html (section 4.2.2)

(b) Smartphone users are used to notifications popping up over their browsers as texts and calls arrive. How can attackers use this to their advantage?

\textbf{Solution:} By simulating an alert or popup on the website, an attacker can fool users into clicking malicious links. This can allow attackers to pose as phone applications such as texting apps or phone apps, which enables phishing.

(c) QR codes haven’t taken off and become ubiquitous like some thought they would. Can you think of any security reasons why this might be the case?

\textbf{Solution:} QR codes placed in public places are perfect targets for people with malicious websites. They can post their own, pretending to be links to useful websites, and instead linking to phishing sites. Or, they can modify and paste over existing codes, which only keen observers would notice.