1 Principles for Building Secure Systems

In this set of notes we look at some general principles for secure system design. These ideas also allow us to examine existing systems to understand their security properties.

1.1 Security is economics.

No system is completely, 100% secure against all attacks. Rather, systems may only need to resist a certain level of attack. There is no point buying a $10,000 firewall to protect $1,000 worth of trade secrets.

Also, it is often helpful to quantify the level of effort that an attacker would need to expend to break the system. Adi Shamir once wrote, “There are no secure systems, only degrees of insecurity.” A lot of the science of computer security comes in measuring the degree of insecurity.

Analogy: Safes come with a rating of their level of security. For instance, a consumer-grade safe might indicate that it will resist attack for up to 5 minutes by anyone without tools. A high-end safe might be rated TL-30: it is secure against a burglar with safecracking tools and limited to 30 minutes access to the safe. (With such a safe, we know that we need to hire security guards who are able to respond to any intrusion within 30 minutes.)

A corollary of this principle is you should focus your energy on securing the weakest links. Security is like a chain: a system is only as secure as the weakest link. Attackers follow the path of least resistance, and they will attack the system at its weakest point. There is no sense putting an expensive high-end deadbolt on a screen door; attackers aren’t going to bother trying to pick the lock when they can just rip out the screen and step through.

1.2 Least privilege.

Give a program the set of access privileges that it legitimately needs to do its job—but nothing more. Try to minimize how much privilege you give each program and system component.

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1Many of these principles are due to Saltzer and Schroeder, who wrote a classic paper in the 1970s with advice on this topic.
Least privilege is an enormously powerful approach. It doesn’t reduce the probability of failure, but it can reduce the expected cost of failures. The less privilege that a program has, the less harm it can do if it goes awry or becomes subverted.\(^2\)

For instance, the principle of least privilege can help reduce the damage caused by buffer overruns. If a program is compromised by a buffer overrun attack, then it will probably be completely taken over by an intruder, and the intruder will gain all the privileges the program had. Thus, the fewer privileges that a program has, the less harm is done if it should someday be penetrated by a buffer overrun attack.

Example: How does Unix do, in terms of least privilege? Answer: Pretty lousy. Every program gets all the privileges of the user that invokes it. For instance, if I run a editor to edit a single file, the editor receives all the privileges of my user account, including the powers to read, modify, or delete all my files. That’s much more than is needed; strictly speaking, the editor probably only needs access to the file being edited to get the job done.

Example: How is Windows, in terms of least privilege? Answer: Just as lousy. Arguably worse, because many users run under an Administrator account, and many Windows programs require that you be Administrator to run them. In this case, every program receives total power over the whole computer. Folks on the Microsoft security team have recognized the risks inherent in this, and have taken many steps to warn people away from running with Administrator privileges, so things have gotten better in this respect.

1.3 Use fail-safe defaults.

Use default-deny policies. Start by denying all access, then allow only that which has been explicitly permitted. Ensure that if the security mechanisms fail or crash, they will default to secure behavior, not to insecure behavior.

Example: the way that firewalls work, they must explicitly decide to forward a given packet or else the packet is lost (dropped). If a firewall suffers a failure, no packets will be forwarded. Thus, a firewall fails safe. This is good for security. It would be much more dangerous if it had fail-open behavior, since then all an attacker would need to do is wait for the firewall to crash (or induce a crash) and then the fort is wide open.

1.4 Separation of responsibility.

Split up privilege, so no one person or program has complete power. Require more than one party to approve before access is granted.

Examples: In a nuclear missile silo, two launch officers must agree before the missile can be launched.

Example: In a movie theater, you pay the teller and get a ticket stub; then when you enter the movie theater, a separate employee tears your ticket in half and collects one half of it,

\(^2\)There are many real-world analogies to this principle. For example, we don’t require exam proctors to carry sidearms when a notepad or a camera will suffice.
putting it into a lockbox. Why bother giving you a ticket that 10 feet later is going to be collected from you? One answer is that this helps prevent insider fraud. Tellers are low-paid employees, and they might be tempted to under-charge a friend, or to over-charge a stranger and pocket the difference. The presence of two employees helps keep them both honest, since at the end of the day, the manager can reconcile the number of ticket stubs collected against the amount of cash collected and detect some common shenanigans.

Example: In many companies, purchases over a certain amount must be approved both by the requesting employee and by a separate purchasing office. This control helps prevent fraud, since it is less likely that both will collude and since it is unlikely that the purchasing office will have any conflict of interest in the choice of vendor.

1.5 Defense in depth.

This is a closely related principle. There’s a saying that you can recognize a security guru who is particularly cautious if you see someone wearing both a belt and a set of suspenders. (What better way to avoid getting caught with your trousers around your ankles?) The principle is that if you use multiple redundant protections, then all of them would need to be breached before the system’s security will be endangered.

1.6 Psychological acceptability.

It is important that your users buy into the security model.

Example: Suppose the company firewall administrator gains a reputation for capriciously, for no good reason, blocking applications that the engineers need to use to get their job done. Pretty soon, the engineers are going to view the firewall as damage and route around it, maybe setting up tunnels, or bypassing it in any number of other ways. This is not a game that the firewall administrator is going to win. No system can remain secure for long when its users actively seek to subvert it.

Example: The system administrator issues an edict that, henceforth, all passwords will be automatically generated unmemorizable strings that are at least 17 characters long, and must be changed once a month. What’s likely to happen is that users will simply write down their password on a yellow sticky attached to their monitor, visible to anyone who looks. Such well-intentioned edicts can ultimately turn out to be counter-productive.

1.7 Human factors matter.

A closely related topic: Security systems must be usable by ordinary people, and must be designed to take into account the role humans will play.

Example: Your web browser pops up security warnings all the time, with vague alarming warnings but no clear indication of what steps you can take and no guidance on how to handle the risk. What are you going to do? If you’re like most of the user population, you’re soon going to learn to always click “Ok” any time a security dialogue box pops up.
Example: The NSA’s cryptographic equipment stores its key material on a small physical token. This token is built in the shape of an ordinary door key. To activate an encryption device, you insert the key into a slot on the device and turn the key. This interface is intuitively understandable, even for 18-year-olds soldiers out in the field with minimal training in cryptography.

1.8  Ensure complete mediation.

When enforcing access control policies, make sure that you check every access to every object. (See the associated notes on Design Patterns for Building Secure Systems for a discussion of reference monitors, a general conceptual approach to ensuring complete mediation.)

Caching is a slightly sticky subject. In some cases, you can get away with not checking every access and allowing security decisions to be cached, but beware. If the context relevant to the security decision changes, and the cache entry isn’t invalidated, then someone might get away with accessing something they shouldn’t.

1.9  Know your threat model.

Be careful with old code. The assumptions originally made might no longer be valid. The threat model may have changed.

Example: In the early days, the Internet was populated only by researchers, who mostly trusted each other. Many networking protocols designed during those days made assumptions that all other network participants were benign and would not try to harm others. Of course, today the Internet is populated by millions of users, who do not always have such benign intent; consequently, many network protocols designed long ago are now suffering under the strain of attack. Spam is one well-known example of this syndrome.

1.10  Detect if you can’t prevent.

If you can’t prevent break-ins, at least detect them (and, where possible, provide a way to recover or to identify the perpetrator). Save audit logs so that you have some way to analyze break-ins after the fact.

Example: FIPS 140-1 sets out a federal standard on tamper-resistant hardware. Type III devices—the highest level of security in the standard—are intended to be tamper-resistant. However, Type III devices are very expensive. Type II devices are only required to be tamper-evident, so that if someone tampers with them, this will be visible (e.g., a seal will be visibly broken). This means they can be built more cheaply and used in a broader array of applications.
1.11 Don’t rely on security through obscurity.

The phrase ‘security through obscurity’ has come to be understood to refer to systems that rely on the secrecy of their design, algorithms, or source code to be secure. The problem with this is that it is brittle: it often proves very hard to keep the design of the system secret from a sufficiently motivated adversary. For instance, every running installation is going to have binary executable code, and it is tedious but not all that difficult to disassemble and reverse-engineer such code. Also problematic is that it is very difficult to assess, with any confidence, the chances that the secret will leak or the difficulty of learning the secret. Moreover, it’s disastrous if this secret ever leaks: it is often hard to update widely-deployed systems, so there may be no recourse if someone ever succeeds in reverse-engineering the code. Historically, security through obscurity has a lousy track record: many systems that have relied upon the secrecy of their code or design for security have failed miserably.

This doesn’t mean that open-source applications are necessarily more secure than closed-source applications. But it does mean that you shouldn’t trust any system that relies on security through obscurity, and you should probably be skeptical about claims that keeping the source code secret makes the system significantly more secure.

1.12 Design security in from the start.

Trying to retrofit security to an existing application after it has already been spec’ed, designed, and implemented is usually a very difficult proposition. At that point, you’re stuck with whatever architecture has been chosen, and you don’t have the option of decomposing the system in a way that ensures least privilege, separation of privilege, complete mediation, defense in depth, and other good properties. Backwards compatibility is often particularly painful, because you can be stuck with supporting the worst insecurities of all previous versions of the software.

Finally, let’s examine three principles that are widely accepted in the cryptographic community (although not often articulated) that can play a useful role in considering computer system security as well.

1.13 Conservative design.

Systems should be evaluated according to the worst security failure that is at all plausible, under assumptions favorable to the attacker. If there is any plausible circumstance under which the system can be rendered insecure, then it is prudent to consider seeking a more secure system. Clearly, however, we must balance this against Security is economics: that is, we must decide the degree to which our threat model indicates we indeed should spend resources addressing the given scenario.

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3One might hear reasoning like: “this system is so obscure, only 100 people around the world understand anything about it, so what are the odds that an adversary will bother attacking it?” One problem with such reasoning is that such an approach is self-defeating. As the system becomes more popular, there will be more incentive to attack it, and then we cannot rely on its obscurity to keep attackers away.
1.14 Kerckhoffs’ principle.

Cryptosystems should remain secure even when the attacker knows all internal details of the system.\textsuperscript{4} The key should be the only thing that must be kept secret, and the system should be designed to make it easy to change keys that are leaked (or suspected to be leaked). If your secrets are leaked, it is usually a lot easier to change the key than to replace every instance of the running software. (This principle is closely related to \textit{Don’t rely on security through obscurity}.)

1.15 Proactively study attacks.

We should devote considerable effort to trying to break our own systems; this is how we gain confidence in their security. Also, because security is a game where the attacker gets the last move, and where it can be very costly if a security hole is discovered after a system is widely deployed, it pays to try to identify attacks before the bad guys find them, so that we have some lead time to close the security holes before they are exploited in the wild.

\textsuperscript{4}We’ll discuss the notions of cryptography and cryptosystems more in subsequent lectures.
2 Design Patterns for Building Secure Systems

In these notes we aim to capture some important patterns for building secure systems, and, in particular, what you can do at design time to improve security. How can you choose an architecture that will help reduce the likelihood of flaws in your system, or increase the likelihood that you will be able to survive such flaws? We begin with a powerful concept, the notion of a trusted computing base (TCB).

2.1 The Trusted Computing Base (TCB).

A trusted component is a part of the system that we rely upon to operate correctly, if the whole system is to be secure; to turn it around, a trusted component is one that is able to violate our security goals if it misbehaves. A trustworthy component is a part of the system that we would be justified in trusting, i.e., where we’d be justified in expecting it to operate correctly. For instance, on Unix systems the super-user (root) is trusted; hopefully people with access to this account are also trustworthy, or else we are in trouble.

In any system, the trusted computing base (TCB) is that portion of the system that must operate correctly in order for the security goals of the system to be assured. We have to rely on every component in the TCB to work correctly. However, anything that is outside the TCB isn’t relied upon in any way: even if it misbehaves or operates maliciously, it cannot defeat the system’s security goals. Indeed, we can take the latter statement as our definition of the TCB: the TCB must be large enough so that nothing outside the TCB can violate security.

Example: Suppose the security goal is that only authorized users are allowed to log into my system using SSH. What is the TCB? Well, the TCB includes the SSH daemon, since it is the one that makes the authentication and authorization decisions—if it has a bug (say, a buffer overrun), or if it was programmed to behave maliciously (say, the SSH implementor has included a backdoor in it), then it will be able to violate my security goal (e.g., by allowing access to unauthorized users). That’s not all. The TCB also includes the operating system, since the operating system has the power to tamper with the operation of the SSH daemon (e.g., by modifying its address space). Likewise, the CPU is in the TCB, since we are relying upon the CPU to execute the SSH daemon’s machine instructions correctly. Suppose a web browser application is installed on the same machine; is the web browser in the TCB? Hopefully not! If we’ve built the system in a way that is at all reasonable, the SSH daemon is supposed to be protected (by the operating system’s memory protection) from interference by unprivileged applications, like a web browser.

Another example: Suppose that we deploy a firewall at the network perimeter to enforce the security goal that only authorized external connections should be permitted into our internal network. Then in this case the firewall is in the TCB for this security goal. In addition, the deployment of the firewall reflects an assumption that all external connections will pass through it. Thus, the network’s physical topology, forwarding and routing configurations, and controls over its access points will also be part of the TCB.
A third example: When we build *access control* into a system, there is always some mechanism that is responsible for enforcing the access control policy. We term such a mechanism as a **reference monitor**. The reference monitor is the TCB for the security goal of ensuring that the access control policy is followed. Basically, the notion of a reference monitor is just the idea of a TCB, specialized to the case of access control.

### 2.2 TCB Design Principles.

Several principles guide us when designing a TCB:

- **Unbypassable**: There must be no way to breach system security by bypassing the TCB.

- **Tamper-resistant**: The TCB should be protected from tampering by anyone else. For instance, other parts of the system outside the TCB should not be able to modify the TCB’s code or state. The integrity of the TCB must be maintained.

- **Verifiable**: It should be possible to verify the correctness of the TCB. This usually means that the TCB should be as simple as possible, as generally it is beyond the state of the art to verify the correctness of subsystems with any appreciable degree of complexity.

Keeping the TCB **simple and small** is good (excellent) practice. The less code you have to write, the fewer chances you have to make a mistake or introduce some kind of implementation flaw. Industry standard error rates are 1–5 defects per thousand lines of code. Thus, a TCB containing 1,000 lines of code might have 1–5 defects, while a TCB containing 100,000 lines of code might have 100–500 defects. If we need to then try to make sure we find and eliminate any defects that an adversary can exploit, it’s pretty clear which one to pick!\(^5\) The lesson is to shed code: design your system so that as much code as possible can be *moved outside* the TCB.

### 2.3 Benefits of TCBs.

Who cares about all this esoteric stuff about TCBs? The notion of a TCB is in fact a very powerful and pragmatic one. The concept of a TCB allows a primitive yet effective form of modularity. It lets us separate the system into two parts: the part that is security-critical (the TCB), and everything else.

This separation is a big win for security. Security is hard. It is really hard to build systems that are secure and correct. The more pieces the system contains, the harder it is to assure its security. If we are able to identify a clear TCB, then we will know that only the parts in the TCB must be correct for the system to be secure. Thus, when thinking about security, we can focus our effort where it really matters. And, if the TCB is only a small fraction of the system, we have much better odds at ending up with a secure system: the less of the system we have to rely upon, the less likely that it will disappoint.

\(^5\)Windows XP consisted of about 40 million lines of code—all of which were in the TCB. Yikes!
Let’s do a concrete example. You’ve been hired by the National Archives to help with their email retention system. They’re chartered with saving a copy of every email ever sent by government officials. They want to ensure that, once a record is saved, it cannot be subsequently deleted or destroyed. For instance, if someone is investigated, they are worried about the threat that someone might try to destroy embarrassing or incriminating documents previously stored in the archives. The security goal is to prevent this kind of after-the-fact document destruction. So, you need to build a document storage system which is “append-only”: once a document is added to the collection, it cannot be removed. How are you going to do it?

One possible approach: You could augment the email program sitting on every government official’s desktop computer to save a copy of all emails to some special directory on that computer. What’s the TCB for this approach? Well, the TCB includes every copy of the email application on every government machine, as well as the operating systems, other privileged software, and system administrators with root/Administrator-level privilege on those machines. That’s an awfully large TCB. The chances that everything in the TCB works correctly, and that no part of the TCB can be subverted, don’t sound too good. After all, any system administrator could just delete files from a special directory after the fact. It’d be nice to have a better solution.

A different idea: We might set up a high-speed networked printer, one that prints from continuous rolls of paper. An email will be considered added to the collection when it has been printed. Let’s feed a giant roll of blank paper into the printer. Once the paper is printed, the paper might spool out into some giant canister. We’ll lock up the room to make sure no one can tamper with the printouts. What’s the TCB in this system? The TCB includes the physical security of the room. Also, the TCB includes the printer: we’re counting on it to be impossible for the printer to be driven in reverse and overwrite previously printed material.

This scheme can be improved if we add a ratchet in the paper spool, so that the spool can only rotate in one direction. Thus, the paper feed cannot be reversed: once something is printed on a piece of paper and it scrolls into the canister, it cannot be later overwritten. Given such a ratchet, we no longer need to trust the printer. The TCB includes only this one little ratchet gizmo, and the physical security for the room, but nothing else. Neat! That sounds like something we could secure.

One problem with this one-way ratcheted printer business is that it involves paper. A lot of paper. (Government bureaucrats can generate an awful lot of email.) Also, paper isn’t keyword-searchable. Instead, let’s try to find an electronic solution.

An all-electronic approach: We set up a separate computer that is networked and runs a special email archiving service. The service accepts connections from anyone; when an email is sent over such a connection, the service adds the email to its local filesystem. The filesystem

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6Assume that you don’t have to worry about the problem of making sure that documents are entered into the archive in the first place. Maybe users will mostly comply initially, and we’re only really worried about a “change of mind.” Or, maybe it is someone else’s job to ensure that the necessary documents get into the archive.
is carefully implemented to provide write-once semantics: once a file is created, it can never be overwritten or deleted. We might also configure the network routers so that hosts cannot connect to any other port or service on that computer. What’s in the TCB now? Well, the TCB includes that computer, the code of this server application, the operating system and filesystem and other privileged code on this machine, the system administrators of this machine, the packet firewall, the physical security mechanisms (locks and so on) protecting the machine room where this computer is located, and so on. The TCB is bigger than with a printer—but it is vastly better than an approach where the TCB includes all the privileged software and privileged users on every government machine. This sounds manageable.

In summary, some good principles are:

- Know what is in the TCB. Design your system so that the TCB is clearly identifiable.
- Try to make the TCB unbypassable, tamper-resistant, and as verifiable as possible.
- Keep It Simple, Stupid (KISS). The simpler the TCB, the greater the chances you can get it right.
- Decompose for security. Choose a system decomposition/modularization based not just on functionality or performance grounds—choose an architecture that makes the TCB as simple and clear as possible.

2.4 TOCTTOU Vulnerabilities.

It is worth knowing about a type of concurrency risk that often has particular relevance when enforcing access control policies such as when using a reference monitor. Consider the following code:

```c
int openregularfile(char *path) {
    struct stat s;
    if (stat(path, &s) < 0)
        return -1;
    if (!S_ISRREG(s.st_mode)) {
        error("only allowed to open regular files; nice try!");
        return -1;
    }
    return open(path, O_RDONLY);
}
```

This code is trying to open a file, but only if it is a regular file (e.g., not a symlink, not a directory, not a special device). On Unix, the `stat()` call is used to extract meta-data about the file, including whether it is a regular file or not. Then, the `open()` call is used to open the file.

The flaw in the above code is that it assumes the state of the filesystem will remain unchanged between the `stat()` and the `open()`. However, this assumption may be faulty if there is any other code that might execute concurrently. Suppose an attacker can change the file that `path` refers to after the call to `stat()` completes, but before `open()` is invoked. If `path`
refers to a regular file when the \texttt{stat()} is executed, but refers to some other kind of file when the \texttt{open()} is executed, this bypasses the check in the code! If that check was there for a security reason, the attacker may be able to subvert system security.

This is known as a \textit{Time-Of-Check To Time-Of-Use} (TOCTTOU) vulnerability, because the meaning of \texttt{path} changed from the time when it is checked (the \texttt{stat()}) and the time when it is used (the \texttt{open()}). In Unix, this often comes up with filesystem calls, because sequences of system calls do not execute in an atomic fashion, and the filesystem is where most long-lived state is stored. However, the risk is not specific to files. In general, TOCTTOU vulnerabilities can arise anywhere that there is mutable state that is shared between two or more entities. For instance, multi-threaded Java servlets and applications are at risk for this kind of flaw.

2.5 Leveraging Modularity.

A well-designed system will be decomposed into modules, where modules interact with each other only through well-defined interfaces. Each module should perform a clear function; the essence is conceptual clarity of what it does (what functionality it provides), not how it does it (how it is implemented).

Sound modular design can also significant strengthen the security properties of a system by providing forms of \textit{isolation}—keeping potential problems localized, and minimizing the assumptions made between components.

For example, consider a network server that listens on a port below 1024. A good design might partition the server into two distinct pieces, each its own process: a small start-up wrapper, and the application itself. Because binding to a port in the range 0–1023 requires root privileges on Unix systems, the wrapper could run as root, bind to the desired port to some file descriptor, and then spawn the application as a separate process and pass it the file descriptor. The application itself could then run as a non-root user, limiting the damage if the application is compromised. We can write the wrapper in just a few dozen lines of code, so we should be able to validate it quite thoroughly.

As another example, consider structuring a web server as a composition of two modules. One module might be responsible for interacting with the network; it could handle incoming network connections and parse them to identify the requested URL. The second module might translate the URL into a filename and read it from the filesystem. Note that the first module can be run with no privileges at all (assuming it is started by a root wrapper that binds to port 80). The second module might be run as some special userid (e.g., \texttt{www}), and we might ensure that only documents intended to be publicly visible are readable by user \texttt{www}. This approach then leverages the file access controls provided by the operating system so that even if the second module is subverted, the attacker cannot harm the rest of the system.

These practices are often known under the name \textit{privilege separation}, because we split the architecture up into multiple modules, some privileged and some unprivileged.