


Public-key encryption



1. $KeyGen() \rightarrow (PK, SK)$
2. $Enc(PK, m) \rightarrow C$
3. $Dec(SK, C) \rightarrow m$

Correctness: $\forall PK, SK \leftarrow KeyGen, \forall m, C = Enc(PK, m)$
 $Dec(SK, C) = m$

Security: similar in spirit to IND-CPA

Semantic security

1

Ch

KeyGen() \rightarrow PK, SK

chooses a message
at random

$b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$

m_b

\forall Adv,

$$\Pr [\text{Adv wins } (b' = b)] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}$$

PK

Adv

$\xrightarrow{\text{PK}}$
 ~~$\xrightarrow{m_0, m_1}$~~ s.t. $|m_0| = |m_1|$
 $\xleftarrow{m_0, m_1}$

$\xrightarrow{\text{Enc}(\text{PK}, m_b)}$
 $\xleftarrow{b'}$

ElGamal cryptosystem (1985)

Keygen()

- generate \$ a large prime p (2048-bit) $\sim 2^{2048}$
- $g \in [2, p-1]$
- generate \$ a secret key $k \in [2, p-2]$
 \parallel
 SK

- $PK = g^k \text{ mod } p$; (g, p public)

Publish PK, Keep SK secret

Due to the DLP assumption, cannot guess k

Enc(PK, m): $m \in [1, \dots, p-1]$

- pick \$ $r \in [1, \dots, p-1]$

$$C = \left(\underbrace{g^r \text{ mod } p}_{C_1} ; \underbrace{m \cdot PK^r \text{ mod } p}_{C_2} \right)$$

Discrete Log Problem
must hold

(not sufficient)

$$(g, p, g^k, C_1, C_2) \sim (g, p, g^k, C_1, R)$$

Dec(SK, (C₁; C₂)):

$$\frac{C_2}{C_1^k} \text{ mod } p = m$$

$$\frac{m \cdot (g^k \text{ mod } p)^r \text{ mod } p \text{ mod } p}{(g^r \text{ mod } p)^k} = m \quad \checkmark$$

Correctness

padding
varying message sizes



plaintext bits

Enc: add padding

Dec: remove padding

$m = 1010$ 00
 ↑ pad
remove padding

↓ padding scheme works
only for messages
of size $<$ plaintext bits

Using this, you can
encrypt 0 with ElGamal

What if I want to encrypt a very long message? GB

Encrypt (PK, very long M):

generate \$ sym key K (AES-CTR)

$\frac{\text{Enc}_{\text{sym}}(K, M)}{C_1}; \frac{\text{Enc}_{\text{pub}}(PK, K)}{C_2}$

Decrypt (SK, (C₁; C₂)):

$\text{Dec}_{\text{pub}}(SK, C_2) \rightarrow K$

$\text{Dec}_{\text{sym}}(K, C_1) \rightarrow M$